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Abstract—Thanks to years of research and development, cur-
rent peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are anything but a homo-
geneous system from a protocol perspective. Specifically, even
for the same P2P system (e.g., BitTorrent), a large number of
protocol variants have been designed based on game theoretic
considerations with the objective to gain performance advantages.
We envision that such variants could be deployed by selfish
participants and interact with the original prescribed protocol as
well as among them. Consequently, a meta-strategic situation—
judiciously selection of different protocol variants—will emerge.
In this work, we propose a general framework, Migration,
based on evolutionary game theory to study the coevolution
of peers for selfish protocol selection, and, most importantly,
its impact on system performance. We apply Migration to P2P
systems and draw on extensive simulations to characterize the
dynamics of selfish protocol selection. The revealed evolution
patterns shed light on both theoretical study and practical system
design.
Keywords—Algorithms design, distributed systems, P2P net-
works, population coevolution, node rationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of a peer-to-peer (P2P) network is con-
tingent on the cooperation of autonomous participants. Such
cooperation, or the lack of it, manifests as the result of ag-
gregated actions taken by rational and strategic peers. Indeed,
based on game theoretic considerations [1], [2], a plethora of
protocol variants have emerged, aiming to take some unfair
advantages in a P2P network. The most notable example is
the BitTorrent file sharing networks. Apart from the original
prescribed protocol [3], participating peers can choose to
deploy protocol variants such as BitThief [4], BitTyrant [5],
PropShare [6], BitMate [7], and Birds [2]. Consequently, a
typical P2P network is anything but a homogeneous system
from a protocol perspective.
In such a variegated environment, a number of interesting
issues arise.
• Which protocol(s) is(are) more preferable in order to gain
an edge in performance?
• Is there a protocol universally preferred by all peers?
• With the coexistence of diverse protocol variants, will a
polymorphic equilibrium be achieved?
• If not, will the system become unstable or even chaotic?
• Most importantly, what is the impact of meta-strategic
behaviors—dynamic protocol selection—on the entire
system performance?
Unfortunately, existing research does not provide insightful
answers to these challenging questions. Specifically, even with
diverse design choices [1], [8], normal-form games are still
being used for modeling pairwise encounters of peers. As such,
general conclusions for systems with protocol diversity are
largely unknown.
In this paper, we meet this research challenge by investi-
gating strategic autonomous protocol selection in a variegated
environment. Population coevolution is employed to describe
the evolution of protocols taken by interacting strategic clients.
In summary, our major contributions are two-fold:
• A Framework for Population Coevolution. We present
a general framework, called Migration, in which the
entire population in P2P networks is classified into dif-
ferent groups, each of which consists of peers taking the
same protocol. Out of self-interests, peers dynamically
migrate among diverse groups. In population coevolution,
we study the dynamics and impact of such migration
patterns.
• Validating Migration in P2P Systems. We validate
Migration in P2P systems. Replicator dynamics [9], [10]
are used for centralized population coevolution with
the global knowledge of peer utility. We first formally
demonstrate that both BitTorrent file sharing and P2P
live streaming are population games, in stark contrast
to traditional adoption of normal-form games. Extensive
simulations on P2P live streaming show patterns of
population coevolution.
The remainder of this paper begins with modeling popular
P2P systems as population games in Section II. We introduce
our framework for population coevolution in Section III.
Section IV considers important implementation issues and
presents extensive simulation results on P2P live streaming.
Recent advances in incentives in distributed systems are stated
in Section V. Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II. P2P SYSTEMS ARE POPULATION GAMES
In this section, after a brief introduction to game modeling,
we analytically prove that P2P systems for file sharing and
live video streaming are both population games. Due to the
limit of space, we omit analytical results associated with the
models.
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2A. Game Modeling Preliminaries
Game theory is generally utilized to model and predict
strategic interactions among distributed client peers [8], [9],
[11].
1) Normal-form Games: Traditional studies often model
peer interactions and node rationality as normal form games
[1], [8], [11]. In normal-form games, pairwise encounters of
peers determine the success of a strategy. That is, a peer
determines its utility based on the other’s strategies. Denote
by A = {ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ K} the strategy space (i.e. the set of
all actions at peers’ choice). K is the number of protocols at
nodes’ choice. uij is then the payoff for a pairwise encounter,
in which one player takes the pure strategy ai, against another
playing the pure strategy aj .
2) Population Games: In contrast, the success of a strategy
in a population game depends on not the strategy of a
neighboring counterpart but the strategy distribution of all
concurrently online peers [9]. Without loss of generality, we
study K types of peers, and mi is the frequency of peers
taking strategy ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ K . Thus, a node that plays
strategy ai yields payoff fi(m), where m denotes population
composition, and
∑
0≤i≤K mi = 1.
B. BitTorrent-like file sharing as a population game
BitTorrent clients utilize optimistic unchoking to discover
potentially better partners by offering some free-wins to some
randomly selected peers. The original bandwidth allocation
policy is to split one’s bandwidth equally among a few fastest
uploading partners [3]. Strategic clients game to win by either
exploiting the original optimistic unchoking design [4] or
modifying the equal split policy [5], [6].
1) Game Against Optimistic Unchoking: We consider the
coexistence of Nt BitThief nodes and Nr BitTorrent clients,
The total number of clients is N = Nt + Nr. The notorious
BitThief [4] is customized to exploit free-wins in BitTor-
rent’s optimistic unchoking by increasing the number of local
connections kt with BitTorrent clients. Suppose that regular
peers connect with both BitTorrent and BitThief clients. Bit-
Thief nodes exclusively connect with regular peers because
their purpose is to exploit altruism in BitTorrent. Thus, for
each optimistic unchoke, BitThief can receive download rate
U/(wr + ar) for 30 seconds [3], where wr is the number
of BitTorrent’s optimistic unchokes and ar is the number of
BitTorrent’s regular unchokes. Denote by kr = ar + wr the
total number of neighbors. Now we show that the number
of optimistic unchokes X received by a BitThief client per
round, which determines the download rate of BitThief clients,
is dependent on the population composition.
THEOREM 1. The game between BitThief and BitTorrent is
a population game because the expected number of optimistic
unchokes received by a BitThief client is
E[X ] = wr ·min{
kt
kr
, (1−
ar
kr
)
Nr
Nt
}, (1)
which depends on the population composition m =
{Nr/N,Nt/N}.
Proof. Connection relationships between BitThief and BitTor-
rent clients dictate the following formula kr · δ ·Nr = kt ·Nt,
where δ is the fraction of BitThief connections per BitThief
client. From kt ≤ Nr, we get δ = min{1, Ntkr ,
kt·Nt
kr ·Nr
}. To
guarantee chunk dissemination among regular BT clients, the
number of a BitTorrent client’s local connections with other
BitTorrent peers is no smaller than the active set size ar. That
is, kr · (1− δ) ≥ ar and δ ≤ 1− arkr . Thus, we have
δ = min{
Nt
kr
,
kt ·Nt
kr ·Nr
, 1−
ar
kr
}.
Denote by nu the number of opportunistic unchokes of a
BitThief client by a BitTorrent client. Then,
E[nu] = wr · δ, (2)
because Pr{nu = i} = Cikr (
wr·δ
kr
)i(1 − wr·δ
kr
)kr−i.
From E[X ] = wr·δ·Nr
Nt
and kt ≤ Nr, we get
E[X ] = wr ·min{
kt
kr
, (1 −
ar
kr
)
Nr
Nt
}. (3)
2) Game Against Default Equal Split: Diverse types of
bandwidth allocation schemes are proposed in the literature
to game against equal split in regular BitTorrent [2], [5]–[7].
THEOREM 2. The coexistence of peers with different
bandwidth allocation rules is a population game.
Proof. Consider two allocation rules g and f at peers’ choice.
We study the steady state in which the average allocated
bandwidth from peers with type x to active neighbors with
type y is Uxy. Then, for a type x peer, we have
axg · Uxg + axf · Uxf = U, (4)
where axy is the number of active neighbors with type y for
a type x peer, x, y ∈ {g, f}. Connections between peers with
two allocation rules imply
Ng · agf = Nf · afg, (5)
where Nx is the number of peers with allocation rule x ∈
{g, f}.
The expected download rate of type x peer is thus
D(U, x) = axg · Ugx + axf · Ufx, (6)
where afg = agf ·NgNf , agg = kr−agf , and aff = kr−agf ·
Ng
Nf
.
Given allocation rules, the optimal neighbor composition for
a type x peer is determined by
a∗xy = min{argmax
axy
{D(U, x)},
Ny · a
∗
yx
Nx
}, (7)
where x, y ∈ {g, f}, x = y.
Suppose that system converges to the optimal neighbor
composition a∗xg. Take type f peer as example. From Equation
6, we get
D(U, f) = a∗gf ·
Ng
Nf
· Ugg + (a− a
∗
gf ·
Ng
Nf
) · Uff , (8)
which depends on Ng
Nf
, and thereby the population composition
of two types of peers.
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3C. Live Streaming Peer Selection as a Population Game
In P2P live streaming systems, overlay topology governed
by peer selection can significantly affect streaming quality
of peers [12]. In our study, clients are logically divided
into multiple groups. In particular, peers with similar upload
bandwidth, certain proximity in terms of round-trip time, or
similar distances towards the source are clustered into the
same group. We utilize clustering index to measure clustering
effects. According to [13], the clustering index of peer i is
defined as
ci =
k˜i
n
, (9)
where k˜i is the number of neighbors within the residential
group of peer i. The average clustering index for peers in
group k is
Ck =
∑
i∈Nk
ci
|Nk|
, (10)
where Nk is the set of clients in group k.
For clarity, we consider two extremes of coexisting peer
selection strategies. One is traditional random peer selection,
randomly selecting neighbors across the network; the other is
network aware peer selection by choosing others in the same
group for connection. Random strategy promotes a random
graph, while network aware peer selection enforces clustering
among peers within the same group. Different population
composition of peers taking either peer selection will modify
the extent of clustering. Our analytical results demonstrate
the significant impact of clustering on streaming quality. This
immediately validates our adoption of population games.
THEOREM 3. The coexistence of different peer selection
strategies for P2P live streaming is a population game.
Proof. The chunk dissemination model is affected by [14], and
we incorporate clustering index to investigate the interactions
among node groups. In the following, we first show that
clustering index is affected by population composition mi =
{mir,m
i
n}, where mir is the fraction of random strategists and
min is the fraction of network aware strategists in group i.
Then, we demonstrate that streaming quality is determined by
m
i and thereby prove that the coexistence of different peer
selection strategies is a population game. We study the chunk
distribution of a typical chunk c.
Denote by N(t) the number of peers in the network at time
slot t, and Ni(t) the number of peers in group i at time slot
t. The clustering indexes of a random strategist and a network
aware strategist from group i are respectively cr = Ni(t)/N(t)
and cn = 1. Thus, the clustering index of group i is
Ci = m
i
r · cr +m
i
n · cn = m
i
r ·
Ni(t)
N(t)
+min, (11)
determined by population composition mi.
Next, given clustering index Ci governed by population
composition, we investigate the impact of clustering on stream-
ing quality, evaluated by the number of chunk holders in group
i at time slot t, Xi(t). The average distribution delay of peers
in group i is
di =
∑timax
t=0 [Xi(t)−Xi(t− 1)] · t
N(timax)
, (12)
where tmax = argt{Xi(t) = Ni(t)}. And the average
distribution delay of the entire network is
d =
∑tmax
t=0 [X(t)−X(t− 1)] · t
N(tmax)
, (13)
where X(t) =
∑
i∈GXi(t) is the total number of chunk
holders in the network, and timax = argt{Xi(t) = Ni(t)}.
The average number of chunk holders for a peer in group
i is thus
ni(t) =
1
Ni(t)
B∑
b=0
Xi(t). (14)
To focus on topological dynamics, we assume random chunk
scheduling. Denote by Yi(t) the number of chunk holders in
group i selecting c to upload at time t. ki is the node degree of
a peer from group i, and kli is the number of links with group
l for a peer from group i. pk(t) is the probability of chunk
holding in group k. Alk(t) is the number of connections from
group l yet without c for a group k node. Zkl(t) represents the
number of copies a peer from group k can upload to group l.
∴ Yi(t) =
1
ni(t)
·Xi(t) and pi(t) =
Xi(t)
Ni(t)
. (15)
∴ Ali(t) ∼ B(k
l
i, 1− pl(t)), (16)
where
kli =
{
ki · Ci if l = i
(1− Ci) · ki ·
Nl(t)·kl·(1−Cl)∑
j =i Nj(t)·kj ·(1−Cj)
otherwise.
(17)
∴ Zil(t) = min{A
l
i(t), ui ·
kli
ki
}. (18)
∴ Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t) +
∑
l∈G
Yl(t) · Zli(t), (19)
which is affected by clustering index Ck and with the initial
condition:
Xi(0) = us ·
Ni(0)
N(0)
. (20)
Suppose that peers join and depart at the end of each time slot.
System dynamics can be easily incorporated into the model:{
N(t+ 1) = N(t) · (1− μdep(t)) + λarr(t)
Xi(t+ 1) = μdep(t) · [Xi(t) +
∑
l∈G Yl(t) · Zli(t)].
(21)
λarr(t) is the aggregate joining rate of the system, and μsep(t)
is the departure rate of each participating peer.
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4III. Migration: A FRAMEWORK FOR POPULATION
COEVOLUTION
In this section, we propose Migration, a framework to study
the coevolution of distributed nodes taking various strategies.
It consists of a population game to model the interactions, and
evolutionary dynamics for population coevolution. We have
already introduced population games in Section II. Now, we
explain population dynamics.
A. Population Dynamics for Global Coevolution
Evolutionary game theory is an extraordinary tool to investi-
gate the behavioral dynamics in large populations. In essence,
learning dynamics specify the transition rate from one group
to another based on utility and population composition. Due
to the lack of deterministic learning rules, converging to Nash
equilibrium, we resort to stochastic learning. Due to the limit
of space, we only introduce replicator dynamics [9].
Replicator Dynamics. The evolution of peer population
follows the basic tenet of Darwinism:
m˙i
mi
= fi(m)− f(m). (22)
where f(m) =
∑
0≤i≤K mi · fi(m) is the average fitness.
The rate of increase m˙i
mi
of the group taking strategy ai
measures its evolutionary success. In this way, the replicator
dynamics mimics natural selection. Such traditional evolution-
ary game theory investigates frequency dependent selection in
well-mixed populations. At the same time, it is equivalent to
fitness proportionate selection in the terminology of evolution-
ary computing [15].
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our algorithms in P2P live
streaming networks.
A. Implementation Issues
Network dynamics implies the volatile nature of utility ex-
perienced by distributed clients. Exponential moving average
(EMA) is adopted to smooth fluctuations in a utility time series
of node p:
Up(t) = α · up(t) + (1− α) · Up(t− 1), (23)
where the constant α reflects the importance given to the most
recent data, and up(t) is the utility at time t.
B. Evaluation for P2P Live Streaming
Network aware peer selection potentially boosts system
performance for P2P live streaming [12]. That is, peers exclu-
sively favoring higher upload capacity (capacity nerds), lower
RTT (proximity nerds), smaller source hop count dsi (source
distance nerds), and lower buffer map overlap (buffer map
nerds), coexist and evolve according to replicator dynamics.
The former three metrics can be easily defined. However,
buffer map overlap cannot be directly derived before node con-
nections. Thus, we utilize the difference between source hop
counts of two nodes to discover peers with small buffer map
overlaps because larger difference indicates higher probability
that peers’ buffer maps are not strongly overlapped [16].
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION DELAY OF DIFFERENT DOMINANT STRATEGIES
Dominant Peer Type Avg Dist Delay Std Deviation
Capacity (static) 7720ms 346ms
Capacity 7545ms 305ms
Proximity 8137ms 241ms
Source Hop 7921ms 251ms
Buffer Map 7927ms 387ms
1) Utility Function: The utility of peer p is
up(ρp(t), dp(t)) = γ · ρp(t) + β · (1 −
dp(t)
d
), (24)
where γ and β are positive scale factors capturing the relative
importance of delivery ratio ρp(t) compared with streaming
delay dp(t), and d is the maximum experienced distribution
delay dependent on specific overlay applications. In our im-
plementation, γ = 0 and β = 10, considering the fact that
delivery ratio is negatively related with distribution delay. We
can vary β to control the speed of population coevolution.
2) Simulation Setup: We modify the event-driven packet-
level simulator originally developed by Zhang et al. [17] for
P2P media streaming. To build a heterogeneous network, we
utilize the 3-class bandwidth distribution scenario: peers are
endowed with upload bandwidth of 128 Kbps, 384 Kbps, and
1, 000 Kbps. To simulate peer dynamics, peers join and leave
the overlay repeatedly with the peer arrival process following
Poisson process. Unless otherwise mentioned, we simulate
400 nodes. The user arrival rate is 10 peers per second and
the expected lifetime is 15 mins. The maximum number of
neighbors maintained by each peer is 15.
3) Global Population Coevolution: Fig. 1 shows the popu-
lation coevolution pattern under different peer lifetime setup.
It reveals that in dynamic systems a stationary population
composition cannot be attained, though it converges to the
dominant peer type of capacity nerds in the static network.
Higher system dynamics incurs higher level of chaotic dom-
inant peer type changes. This shows that, in face of system
dynamics, the assumption of fictitious play is not substantiated
in the long run. In previous game theoretic studies, fictitious
play is an important assumption that peers take a stationary
(i.e., time independent) mixed strategy [1], [10]. Table I
compares the experienced streaming quality during periods of
dominant peer types in the static overlay and the overlay with
the expected lifetime of 15 minutes. Fig. 2 manifests that lower
α can increase the average duration of dominant peer types,
due to more emphasis on past experienced utility.
V. RELATED WORK
Incentives in P2P systems have been extensively studied in
the research community. The well known tit-for-tat strategy to
avoid free riding is adopted by BitTorrent (BT) [3]. Buragohain
et al. [1] pioneer game theoretic incentive mechanism design
in P2P systems by modeling interactions among rational and
strategic peers as a non-cooperative game. Yeung and Kwok
[8] present the repeated packet exchange game to motivate re-
ciprocal relationships between two neighboring peers. Parallel
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Fig. 1. Population coevolution (α = 1.0).
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Fig. 2. Impact of α on population coevolution (α = 0.6).
to this line of thought, Lin et al. [11] propose a cheat proof co-
operation strategy by taking peer capacity into consideration.
Measurements of PPLive users demonstrate the inefficacy of
such bilateral incentive strategies, when applied to live video
streaming environment [16]. To this end, Piatek et al. suggest
to provide incentives by locating high contribution peers closer
to the source servers. The rationale is that nodes closer to
the streaming source can obtain higher streaming quality, as
demonstrated by capacity aware overlay construction strate-
gies. Feldman et al. [18] studies the evolution of cooperators,
defectors, and reciprocators in P2P networks. However, all the
above studies fail to consider decisions of individual peers for
autonomous protocol selection. With the continual evolution
of P2P systems, the advent of diverse protocol options shows
the imperativeness of a study on the coevolution of distributed
nodes in such a variegated environment.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Node rationality and incentives are both critical design con-
siderations in distributed systems. However, the coevolution
among strategic nodes for rational decisions is still largely
unexplored. In this paper, we leverage on evolutionary game
theory, present population coevolution algorithms, and reveal
essential patterns. We first introduce population games and
population dynamics in our framework Migration. In this
manner, the elusive dynamical interactions among distributed
nodes can be effectively scrutinized by investigating migration
patterns of nodes taking different protocols. Extensive simu-
lations for P2P live streaming are presented to validate our
modeling efforts.
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